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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
 
 John Marrone and Michael Paris appeal from sentences 
imposed following their convictions on RICO and gambling 
offenses.  They were indicted, tried, and convicted with six 
other defendants, all of whom were associated with the Genovese 
Crime Family (GCF).  Though all defendants appealed, this opinion 
addresses only certain sentencing issues raised by Marrone and 
Paris.1  Specifically, Paris argues that a RICO predicate act for 
                     
1
.  Finding no merit in any of the contentions raised by the 
other defendants, we have today affirmed the convictions and 
sentences of all the other defendants.  
  
which he was previously convicted should not have been used as 
the basis for added criminal history points.  In Marrone's case, 
the predicate act was not used for criminal history points, but 
to determine his status as a career offender.  He contends this 
was improper.  We will discuss their contentions separately but 
in one opinion because the legal issues overlap. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742.  To the extent that defendants challenge the 
district court's legal interpretation of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, we exercise plenary review.  United States v. 
Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir. 1990).  
 I. 
 PARIS - CRIMINAL HISTORY POINTS 
 The indictment charged that Paris was an "associate" of 
the GCF, subordinate to defendant Salvatore Lombardi, a 
"caporegime" in the GCF.  After a jury trial, Paris was convicted 
on several counts, including conspiracy to conduct and 
participate in the conduct of the GCF's affairs through a pattern 
of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) 
(Count 1); conducting and participating in the conduct of the 
GCF's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Count 2); and various gambling 
offenses not at issue in this appeal. 
 Paris had been previously convicted for a predicate act 
charged in Count 2.  Specifically, the indictment charged Paris 
with an attempted bribery to which he pled guilty in New York 
state court on February 26, 1992 and for which he was sentenced 
  
to one to three years imprisonment.  In convicting Paris on Count 
2, the jury found this predicate act proven by special 
interrogatory. 
 The district court did not factor the attempted bribery 
into Paris' base offense level.  Instead, the court assessed 
three criminal history points against Paris under U.S.S.G. § 
4A1.1(a), which placed him in criminal history category II.  The 
court then sentenced Paris to 57 months imprisonment running 
consecutively to his state bribery sentence, followed by three 
years supervised release, plus a fine of $7500 and a special 
assessment of $250. 
 In sentencing a RICO defendant, the district court must 
apply "the offense level applicable to the underlying 
racketeering activity" or an offense level of 19, whichever is 
greater.  U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1.  The district court found that Paris' 
underlying conduct, apart from the attempted bribery, resulted in 
an offense level of 17, and therefore assigned him a base offense 
level of 19.  The court also assessed a three level increase for 
Paris' managerial and supervisory role, giving him a total 
offense level of 22. 
 In arriving at a defendant's criminal history, a 
district court must add three criminal history points "for each 
prior sentence of imprisonment" exceeding 13 months.  U.S.S.G. § 
4A1.1(a).  The Guidelines define "prior sentence" as "any 
sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt . . . for 
conduct not part of the instant offense."  Id. § 4A1.2(a)(1) 
(emphasis added).  The commentary to section 4A1.2 explains that 
  
a prior sentence is one "imposed prior to sentencing on the 
instant offense . . . .  A sentence imposed after the defendant's 
commencement of the instant offense, but prior to sentencing on 
the instant offense, is a prior sentence if it was for conduct 
other than conduct that was part of the instant offense."  Id. § 
4A1.2, comment. (n.1). 
 Paris argues that because the bribery was included as a 
predicate act, it was part of the "instant offense" and therefore 
should not have been the basis of criminal history points.2  The 
district court was not persuaded that the bribery conduct should 
be encompassed for sentencing purposes into the "instant offense" 
and instead treated it as a prior sentence.  It relied on 
commentary to section 2E1.1 (Racketeering) which discusses when 
conduct is to be assigned to criminal history rather than to the 
"instant offense."  Under that commentary, conduct charged as 
part of the "pattern of racketeering activity" that was the 
subject of an earlier conviction and sentence should be treated 
as a "prior sentence" under section 4A1.2(a)(1) (referring to 
instructions for Computing Criminal History) and not as part of 
the "instant offense" if the defendant was convicted for that 
conduct before the "last overt act of the instant offense."  See 
U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1, comment. (n.4) (hereafter Application Note 4).3 
                     
2
.  Paris raises but does not fully develop this argument in his 
brief.  However, he joins in the arguments of his co-appellant 
Marrone, who does develop the issue in the context of challenging 
his classification as a career offender.  
3
.  The full text of Application Note 4 provides: 
 
  
 We are bound by "commentary in the Guidelines Manual 
that interprets or explains a guideline . . . unless it violates 
the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, 
or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline."  Stinson v. 
United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1915 (1993).  We must therefore 
determine whether Application Note 4, under which certain 
sentences imposed for conduct underlying a RICO conviction are 
treated as "prior sentences" for criminal history purposes, is 
inconsistent with section 4A1.2(a)(1). 
 In a series of cases, albeit in another context, we 
have noted that Congress did not intend "RICO to be a substitute 
for the predicate offense," but instead "intended to create 
separate offenses for the predicate acts and the substantive RICO 
charge."  United States v. Esposito, 912 F.2d 60, 63-64 (3d Cir. 
1990), cert. dismissed, 498 U.S. 1075 (1991); see also United 
States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Congress, 
in enacting RICO, sought to allow the separate prosecution and 
(..continued) 
 Certain conduct may be charged in the count of 
conviction as part of a "pattern of racketeering 
activity" even though the defendant has previously been 
sentenced for that conduct.  Where such previously 
imposed sentence resulted from a conviction prior to 
the last overt act of the instant offense, treat as a 
prior sentence under § 4A1.2(a)(1) and not as part of 
the instant offense.  This treatment is designed to 
produce a result consistent with the distinction 
between the instant offense and criminal history found 
throughout the guidelines.  If this treatment produces 
an anomalous result in a particular case, a guideline 
departure may be warranted. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1, comment. (n.4). 
  
punishment of predicate offenses and a subsequent RICO 
offense."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054, 481 U.S. 1018 (1987); 
United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 232 (3d Cir.) ("The 
predicate offenses . . . are not themselves the RICO violation[;] 
they are merely one element of the crime.  [RICO] does not 
prohibit the commission of the individual racketeering acts.  
Rather, it bans the operation of an on-going enterprise by means 
of those acts."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983).  
 Similarly, for criminal history purposes, the 
Sentencing Commission has clarified that a RICO violation should 
be considered separate from any previously convicted predicate 
act.  See U.S.S.G. App.C, amend. 142 (Application Note 4 added 
"to clarify the treatment of certain conduct for which the 
defendant previously has been sentenced as either part of the 
instant offense or prior criminal record").  Although a predicate 
act constitutes an element of a RICO violation, the previously 
convicted RICO offender is in effect a repeat offender who breaks 
the law once by committing a predicate act and again by engaging 
in a pattern of racketeering activity.  The Sentencing Commission 
has declared that a repeat offender "is more culpable than a 
first offender and thus deserving of greater punishment," and 
that "[r]epeated criminal behavior is an indicator of a limited 
likelihood of successful rehabilitation."  U.S.S.G. Ch.4, Part A, 
intro. comment. 
 The Commission accordingly provided that where a 
defendant has previously been convicted for a RICO predicate act, 
that conviction should be factored into the defendant's criminal 
  
history score rather than the base offense level.  Cf. U.S.S.G. § 
2D1.5, comment. (n.3) (if a conviction for engaging in a 
continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 is 
supported by conduct for which the defendant has previously been 
sentenced, "[a] sentence resulting from a conviction sustained 
prior to the last overt act of the instant offense is to be 
considered a prior sentence under § 4A1.2(a)(1) and not part of 
the instant offense"). 
 Apparently no appellate court has addressed this issue 
in an opinion in the RICO context.  However, in United States v. 
Crosby, 913 F.2d 313, 315 (6th Cir. 1990), the court sustained 
the Commission's approach in the context of the guideline on 
continuing criminal enterprise, saying: "If a conviction occurs 
while the criminal enterprise is continuing, a court should 
include the sentence resulting from that conviction in the 
criminal history for calculating the sentence for involvement in 
a continuing criminal enterprise. . . . The sentencing guidelines 
reflect the unique nature of a continuing criminal enterprise by 
including prior sentences in the defendant's criminal history, 
even if the prior sentences are for crimes committed in 
furtherance of the continuing criminal enterprise."  Cf. United 
States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099, 1111 (2d Cir.) (government 
unsuccessful in arguing that district court erred in assessing 
prior conviction of RICO defendant only in calculating criminal 
history and not in calculating base offense level; "district 
court reasonably construed Note 4 to mean that the conduct 
underlying the previously imposed sentence should not be used in 
  
calculating the base level for the instant [RICO] offense"), 
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1511, 113 S. Ct. 199 (1992). 
 The Commission's treatment of the prior conviction for 
a RICO predicate act, reflected in its commentary in Application 
Note 4, avoids the anomaly of treating a RICO defendant with a 
previous conviction for conduct that is part of a continuing 
pattern of racketeering activity as a first offender with a 
criminal history category of I.4  Admittedly, the Sentencing 
Commission could have amended the guidelines to achieve the same 
result.  It was, however, equally free to amend the commentary 
"if the guideline which the commentary interprets will bear the 
construction."  Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1919.   
 Application Note 4 constitutes an interpretation of the 
RICO guideline that "may not be compelled by the guideline text" 
but is nonetheless "not plainly erroneous or inconsistent" with 
section 4A1.2(a)(1).  Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1920 (quotation and 
citation omitted).  We are therefore bound to accept Application 
Note 4 as written.5 
                     
4
.  To be sure, absent Application Note 4 the previously 
convicted conduct would be factored into the RICO defendant's 
base offense level.  However, here as in most cases, the increase 
in criminal history score resulting from Application Note 4 
produces a higher guideline range than would the incorporation of 
the previously sentenced conduct into the base offense level. 
5
.  Effective November 1, 1993, the Sentencing Commission amended 
the commentary to section 4A1.2 to state, "Conduct that is part 
of the instant offense means conduct that is relevant conduct to 
the instant offense under the provisions of § 1B1.3 (Relevant 
Conduct)."  U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. (n.1) (Nov. 1993).  
Marrone argues that this brings section 4A1.2 into conflict with 
Application Note 4.  We do not so read it.  Instead, Application 
Note 4 represents the Commission's permissible construction of a 
  
 Neither United States v. Hallman, 23 F.3d 821 (3d Cir.) 
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 216 (1994), nor United States v. Kenyon, 
7 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 1993), compel a contrary result.  In 
Hallman, we held that a state conviction for forgery could not 
count as a prior sentence under section 4A1.2(a)(1) because it 
was "part of a common scheme and plan" including the instant 
offense of possession of stolen mail, where all of the stolen 
mail was in the form of checks or credit cards and the forged 
check underlying the state conviction was from a sequence of 
checks found within the stolen mail.  See Hallman, 23 F.3d at 
826.  Because Hallman was not a RICO defendant who participated 
in a pattern of racketeering activity apart from any single 
predicate act, reducing his criminal history score neither 
implicated Application Note 4 nor contravened the policy of the 
criminal history guideline. 
 In Kenyon, on which Paris and Marrone both rely, the 
defendant pled guilty in state court to possession of cocaine and 
in federal court to conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to 
distribute.  The court held that it was error to count the state 
conviction toward Kenyon's criminal history score because the 
conduct underlying the state conviction "comprise[d] part of the 
conduct" and was "part of the same criminal scheme" for which he 
was convicted in federal court.  Kenyon, 7 F.3d at 787.  Like 
(..continued) 
defendant's criminal history in the unique context of a RICO 
offense. 
  
Hallman, however, Kenyon was not charged with participating in a 
pattern of racketeering activity as defined in RICO. 
 Paris argues in the alternative that Application Note 4 
does not apply by its own terms because his bribery sentence did 
not result "from a conviction prior to the last overt act of the 
instant offense."  U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1, comment. (n.4).  He notes 
that he pled guilty to the bribery in state court on February 26, 
1992, which was after the date of the last overt act charged in 
the indictment (February 17, 1992).  See App. at 182-83.  
However, Application Note 4 refers to the last overt act of the 
offense, not the last act charged in the indictment, and the 
district court found that the last overt act of the offense, 
Marrone's purchase of a silencer from an undercover officer, 
occurred on March 18, 1992, after Paris' guilty plea.  His 
bribery conviction thus properly falls under Application Note 4,6 
and the district court did not err in treating it as part of 
criminal history.7 
                     
6
.  In the district court and at oral argument in this court, 
Paris argued that Marrone's purchase of a silencer was not 
chargeable to him because it was not reasonably foreseeable.  He 
did not make this argument in his brief and therefore may have 
waived it.  In any event, Application Note 4 does not refer to 
the last act chargeable to the defendant, and Paris has cited no 
authority to support such a requirement. 
7
.  We find no merit in Paris' other arguments that (1) the 
judgments of conviction as to Count 1 must be vacated and 
reversed because the government failed to adduce sufficient 
evidence connecting him to the RICO conspiracy and to the RICO 
enterprise; (2) the district court erred in assessing him a 
three-level upward adjustment for "aggravating role" under 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b); (3) the district court erred in refusing to 
allow a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of 
responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1; and (4) the district court 
  
 II. 
 MARRONE-CAREER OFFENDER STATUS 
 Marrone also argues that the district court erred in 
its treatment of his prior sentence, in his case for arson, which 
he contends was part of the "instant offense."  Unlike Paris, 
whose prior sentence was used as the basis to add criminal 
history points, the arson sentence was used in Marrone's case to 
classify him as a career offender.    
 The indictment charged that Marrone was a "made member" 
of the GCF, subordinate to Salvatore Lombardi.  After the jury 
trial, Marrone was convicted on several counts, including 
conspiracy to conduct and participate in the conduct of the GCF's 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count 1); conducting and participating in 
the conduct of the GCF's affairs through a pattern of 
racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Count 
2); and various gambling offenses not at issue in this appeal.   
 One of the predicate acts charged in Count 2 against 
Marrone was a 1982 arson for which he was sentenced in a New 
Jersey state court in 19858.  In convicting Marrone on Count 2, 
the jury found this predicate act proven by special 
interrogatory. 
(..continued) 
erred in declining to reduce his guideline sentence for time 
spent in jail prior to the commencement of his sentence under 
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) or by way of a downward departure pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1, comment. (n.4), and U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, p.s. 
8
.  The presentence report does not state when Marrone was 
convicted for the arson, though it occurred after the 
commencement of the conduct charged as RICO in the indictment. 
  
 As in the case of Paris, the district court did not 
factor the arson into Marrone's base offense level.  Instead, the 
court relied on his arson conviction, as well as an unrelated 
earlier conviction for using extortionate means to collect an 
extension of credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894, to classify 
him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (Nov. 1992).  The 
district court then sentenced Marrone to a total of 293 months 
imprisonment, followed by three years supervised release, and a 
special assessment of $350. 
 A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant 
was at least eighteen years old at the time of the instant 
offense; (2) the instant offense is a felony that is a crime of 
violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant 
has "at least two prior felony convictions" of a crime of 
violence or a controlled substance offense.  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.9  
To have two prior felony convictions, the defendant must have 
"committed the instant offense subsequent to sustaining" the two 
convictions, and the sentences for the two convictions must be 
"counted separately under the provisions of § 4A1.1(a), (b), or 
(c)."  Id. § 4B1.2(3). 
                     
9
.  A career offender's offense level is the greater of the 
offense level applicable to the underlying conduct or the 
appropriate offense level specified in section 4B1.1.  A career 
offender automatically receives a criminal history category of 
VI.  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.  Here, the district court assigned Marrone 
a total offense level of 33, two levels lower than that 
calculated in the presentence report but still greater than the 
relevant level under § 4B1.1. 
  
 Marrone argues first that his designation as a career 
offender was improper because the 1982 arson cannot be used as a 
"prior conviction" under section 4B1.1, which he notes is to be 
governed by section 4A1.2(a)(1).  In effect, he would have us 
disregard Application Note 4 to section 2E1.1, the racketeering 
guideline.  In our discussion of Paris' sentencing we have 
already rejected the argument made by Marrone that Application 
Note 4 is inconsistent with section 4A1.2(a)(1).  We have 
concluded instead that Application Note 4 is a permissible 
interpretation of the guidelines applicable in the specific 
context of RICO.  Therefore, we agree with the government that a 
prior conviction for a predicate act can increase a RICO 
defendant's criminal history score.   
 Marrone's argument seems to be predicated on the 
assumption that the "two prior felony convictions" referred to in 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 which are necessary before the defendant is 
designated as a career offender must be separate from the 
"instant offense."  That assumption is mistaken.  Although 
section 4B1.2 defines "two prior felony convictions" under the 
career offender guideline to mean that the sentences of at least 
two such convictions are "counted separately," it does not 
mandate that these convictions must have resulted from "conduct 
not part of the instant offense."  Instead, "the sentences that 
must be separate in this sense are the sentences imposed for the 
prior convictions . . . .  The two prior convictions must be 
separate from each other," not necessarily from the instant 
offense.  United States v. Belton, 890 F.2d 9, 10-11 (7th Cir. 
  
1989) (permitting state conviction that "punished conduct . . . 
part of [the instant] offense" to serve as predicate felony for 
career offender guideline).  Here, Marrone's two prior 
convictions were separate from each other and he does not contend 
otherwise.   
 Moreover, as the Belton court recognized, classifying a 
defendant as a career offender because of conduct related to the 
offense of conviction is consistent with the policy of the career 
offender guideline.  See Belton, 890 F.2d at 10 ("Continuing to 
participate in a drug conspiracy after having been convicted of a 
drug offense manifests a propensity for recidivism as plainly as 
if the conspiracy had been started from scratch.").  A career 
offender is "incorrigible, undeterrable, recidivating, [and] 
unresponsive to the 'specific deterrence' of having been 
previously convicted," id., an accurate description of Marrone, 
who continued to participate in racketeering activity despite his 
convictions for extortion and arson. 
 Marrone next argues that his designation as a career 
offender was improper because the "instant offense" was not 
committed subsequent to his arson conviction as required by  
section 4B1.2(3) if it is to be used for career offender 
purposes.  However, his RICO conduct, i.e. the "instant offense," 
continued well past his arson conviction, and "continued 
participation in a conspiracy [or RICO offense] after a felony 
conviction renders that conviction a prior felony conviction" for 
purposes of career offender sentencing.  United States v. Elwell, 
984 F.2d 1289, 1298 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2429 
  
(1993).  See also Belton, 890 F.2d at 10 ("[T]he 'subsequent' 
offense need not be entirely subsequent to preserve the relation 
between the [career offender] guideline and its animating policy 
of punishing the recidivist more severely.").   
 We find no error in the district court's designation of 
Marrone as a career offender.10 
 III. 
 CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgments 
of conviction and sentences of Michael Paris and John Marrone. 
                     
10
.  We find no merit in Marrone's additional arguments that  
(1) the district court should have ordered a detailed bill of 
particulars due to the lack of specificity of the pleading of the 
Count 1 racketeering acts, and (2) there was insufficient 
evidence to support the jury's finding of proven on racketeering 
act 6(a) of Count 1 and racketeering act 4 of Count 2. 
